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PREEMPTION OF COMMON LAW CLAIMS AND
THE PROSPECTS FOR FIFRA: JUSTICE STEVENS
PUTS THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE
JENNIFER S. HENDRICKS†
INTRODUCTION
On a range of high-profile issues from affirmative action to sexual
privacy to sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court in its 2002 Term declined to take the next expected step in its conservative revision of constitutional law.1 With less fanfare, the Court did the same on preemption doctrine. On the question of when and to what extent federal safety regulations
preempt state tort claims against regulated industries, a unanimous Court in
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine2 halted what one scholar has identified as an
unacknowledged but increasingly broad presumption in favor of preemption.3 And in a single paragraph, the Court rejected the reasoning of countless lower court decisions in favor of preemption.4 By speaking unanimously, the Court suggested that it had finally resolved key preemption
issues on which it has waffled in recent years. While the opinions in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh,5 decided later
in the 2002 Term, have been said to crystallize the Justices’ remaining philosophical disagreements on preemption doctrine,6 Sprietsma established
important areas of agreement, or at least truce.
This article examines Sprietsma’s implications for preemption doctrine and applies its holdings to one federal statute whose preemptive scope
the Supreme Court will address this Term: the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-

† Meloy Trieweiler Law Firm, Helena, Montana.
1. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action admissions program); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down sodomy law); Nev. Dep’t of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that federal Family and Medical Leave Act is enforceable against states).
2. 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
3. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967
(2002).
4. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 64; see also, infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text.
5. 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
6. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 449 (2003).
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cide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).7 Under FIFRA’s authority, the Environmental Protection Agency, not the states, controls the labeling of pesticides.8 The overwhelming majority of lower courts have held that FIFRA’s
regulatory scheme preempts at least some common law tort actions against
pesticide manufacturers.9 The two holdouts are the Montana Supreme
Court10 and the Oregon Court of Appeals,11 which have held that FIFRA
preemption applies only to labeling requirements established by positive
enactments of state law, not to tort claims. Sprietsma was a victory for
these FIFRA dissenters and a defeat for the pesticide industry, which has
sought through FIFRA to immunize itself from tort claims. It was also a
victory for Justice Stevens, whose careful opinion in an earlier case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,12 has been transformed by the pesticide industry and the lower courts into a mandate for FIFRA preemption.13 As the author of the unanimous Sprietsma decision, Justice Stevens reined in these
unintended progeny of his Cipollone opinion, choosing instead a new
course away from the presumption in favor of preemption.
The history of preemption doctrine, however, is a history of doctrinal
confusion and frequent changes of course. The Court’s decision in Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences, a FIFRA preemption case to be decided this Term,14
may reveal whether the Court really meant what it said in Sprietsma.

7. 7 U.S.C. § 136-136v (2000).
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text. In this article I refer to the state law claims
that may be preempted as both “common law claims” and “tort claims” because cases involving personal injury are the most common and also the most troubling when preemption means there is no remedy for the injury. It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs in such cases often also plead theories that
sound in contract, such as breach of warranties related to safety. Many FIFRA preemption cases are
also “efficacy cases,” in which the plaintiff claims that an agricultural pesticide did not work or even
harmed the crop. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Case No. 03-388 pending in the Supreme Court, is an
efficacy case.
10. Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000) (overruling McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Co., 947 P.2d 474 (Mont. 1997), and allowing plaintiffs to proceed with
claims for negligent design and manufacture, strict liability for defective design and manufacture, failure to warn, and breach of express and implied warranties), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814 (2001). The author’s law firm represents the plaintiffs in Sleath, which is now awaiting trial on remand.
11. Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 846 (Or. App. 1999), review denied, 6 P.3d 1098 (Or.
2000); see also Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. DowElanco, 64 F.Supp. 2d 939 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that
court was compelled by precedent to find preemption but urging Court of Appeals to reconsider FIFRA
preemption), rev’d 255 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that FIFRA did not preempt claim for unfair
interference with prospective business advantage, based on change in label requested by manufacturer
and approved by EPA), rev’d on rehearing, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that claim was preempted).
12. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
13. See infra notes 103-116 and accompanying text.
14. Case No. 03-388, on writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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I. THE SPRIETSMA CASE
Sprietsma was a preemption case under the Federal Boat Safety Act
(“FBSA”).15 The FBSA authorizes the Coast Guard to issue regulations to
promote safety in boating, and it contains an “express preemption” clause,
that is, a clause that expressly uses Congress’s power under the Supremacy
Clause to displace state law:
Unless permitted by the Secretary [of Transportation] under section 4305
of this title, a State or political subdivision of a State may not establish,
continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for associated equipment . . . that is not
16
identical to a regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title.

This preemption clause is qualified by a “saving clause,” which preserves
some state law despite the preemption clause:
Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at com17
mon law or under State law.

Under the express preemption clause, the Secretary of Transportation has
generally permitted state statutes and regulations to stand if they govern
topics on which no federal regulation exists. Once a federal regulation is
issued on a topic, however, it preempts state standards unless they are identical to the federal standard.18
In the late 1980s, the Coast Guard appointed a committee to consider
requiring propeller guards on motor boats.19 The committee recommended
regulations requiring the guards under some circumstances.20 But the Coast
Guard had not acted on the bulk of the recommendations by the time
Sprietsma arrived in the Supreme Court in 2002.21 The Coast Guard told
the Court that it planned to do so in unspecified “subsequent regulatory
projects.”22
Meanwhile, Jeanne Sprietsma died after being struck by the propeller
of an outboard motor. Her husband brought common law tort claims in Illinois state court alleging that the motor was unreasonably dangerous, in part

15. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000).
16. 46 U.S.C. § 4306.
17. 46 U.S.C. § 4311.
18. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 59-60 (2002).
19. See id. at 60-61.
20. See id. at 61-62 (noting committee recommendation that propeller guards or other “propeller
injury avoidance methods” be required on “new planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length with propellers aft of the transom,” as well as on any “nonplaning houseboat for rent”).
21. See id. at 62.
22. Id.
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because it lacked a propeller guard.23 The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether, as the manufacturer argued, the Coast Guard’s
failure to require propeller guards on all motor boats barred the plaintiff’s
claim that this particular boat was defectively designed because it lacked a
guard.24
To anyone who has not followed the Supreme Court’s preemption
cases over the last decade, this issue hardly seems worth the Court’s consideration. After all, the Coast Guard did not ban propeller guards; it only
failed to act on the guards. And its inaction appears to have stemmed from
bureaucratic inertia, not a belief that propeller guards were bad. Moreover,
states were free to require propeller guards affirmatively under an exemption granted by the Secretary of Transportation.25 And the saving clause
clearly says that the FBSA does not preempt common law liability.26 Why
would the Supreme Court grant certiorari merely to affirm Congress’s
clearly expressed intent not to preempt a claim like Mr. Sprietsma’s?
The answer is that the Illinois trial, appellate, and supreme courts had
all held that Mr. Sprietsma’s claim was in fact preempted by the FBSA.27
Nor were the Illinois courts alone: the Fifth,28 Eighth,29 and Eleventh30 Circuits, as well as the Michigan Supreme Court,31 had held the same. Justifying its grant of certiorari by a split of authority, the Supreme Court could
cite only one jurisdiction, Texas, that had rejected the FBSA preemption
defense.32

23. Id. at 54-55.
24. Id. at 54.
25. Id. at 60, 65-66 (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 6914-15 (1973)).
26. To the uninitiated, the saving clause may even seem unnecessary: the rule is well-established
at common law that compliance with government regulations is admissible evidence in a tort suit but is
not a complete defense; regulations set the floor, not the ceiling, for the standard of care. See 2 American Law Institute, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Approaches to Legal and Institutional
Change, 83-84 (Reporters’ Study 1991); see also Daniel B. Nelson, 1995 ANN. SURV. AMER. L. 565,
571-72 (discussing pros and cons of dual remedial systems).
27. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55.
28. Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2000).
29. Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1995).
30. Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997).
31. Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1997).
32. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55 n. 3 (citing Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994)). In addition to the Texas Supreme Court, intermediate courts of appeals in
California and Missouri had ruled against FBSA preemption of propeller guard claims. See LaPlante v.
Wellcraft Marine Corp., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196 (Cal. App. 2002); Ard. v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo.
App. 1999) (ruling against FBSA preemption of propeller guard claims). No federal court had done so
before Sprietsma. In addition to the federal courts of appeals listed above, a few federal district courts in
other circuits had ruled in favor of preemption. See Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F.Supp. 183
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Nor were these decisions anomalies in modern preemption doctrine.
After an exhaustive review of a century of preemption decisions, Professor
Mary Davis confidently predicted that Sprietsma would be decided in favor
of preempting Mr. Sprietsma’s claim.33 Her prediction was wrong not because her analysis was faulty but because Sprietsma abandoned a course
the Court had been charting since Cipollone a decade before.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PREEMPTING THE COMMON LAW34
A. Basics of Preemption Doctrine
Federal preemption of state law can occur in two ways: express preemption or implied preemption. Either of these forms of preemption can
preempt two categories of state law: positive law or common law.35 Courts
make decisions about whether a federal statute either expressly or implicitly preempts either type of state law by relying on presumptions favoring
or disfavoring particular types of preemption.36
Many federal statutes have express preemption clauses like the one in
the FBSA. When such a clause is present, it is clear Congress intended to
preempt some state law. The only question is the scope of that preemption.
For example, the FBSA preempts any state law or regulation “establishing
a recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety
standard.”37 Thus, to determine whether a particular state law is preempted,
a court must decide whether it is a “performance or other safety standard”
for a “recreational vessel or associated equipment” as those words are used
in the statute. Similarly, FIFRA preempts only some state laws related to
pesticides: FIFRA’s express preemption clause prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements on pesticides, but it does not prohibit them from
regulating matters such as the sale, use, or disposal of pesticides.38
Even when a federal statute contains no express preemption clause,
courts may conclude that it implicitly preempts some state law. Implied

(E.D. Cal. 1996); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F.Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (ruling in favor of preemption).
33. Davis, supra note 3, at 1025-28.
34. For a more comprehensive history, see id.
35. See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text (discussing two seminal cases on the distinction
between positive law and common law for purposes of preemption).
36. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
37. 46 U.S.C. § 4306.
38. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (preemption clause); see also 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2000) (saving clause);
Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (affirming state authority to regulate pesticide
use).
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preemption occurs in three ways: impossibility preemption, where state and
federal law are in such direct conflict that it is impossible to comply with
the dictates of both; obstacle preemption, where dual compliance is technically possible but the state law nonetheless creates an obstacle to fulfilling
federal policy; and field preemption, where Congress has so completely
taken over a field of law as to create an inference of federal exclusivity.39
For example, even if FIFRA did not have an express preemption clause
about pesticide labeling, state labeling laws might be preempted by one or
more forms of implied preemption. A state law requiring warning labels to
be orange would be preempted by “impossibility preemption” if federal law
required labels to be red. A state law requiring many warnings on a label
might be preempted if it created an “obstacle” to a federal goal of keeping
labels simple and easy to understand. Or all state labeling laws might be
preempted by “field preemption” because FIFRA is so comprehensive that
it suggests Congress intended to take over the field. Complicating matters,
the Supreme Court has also occasionally found implied preemption even
when the statute also contains an express preemption clause.40 The result is
greater preemption than the express clause specifies. With any form of implied preemption, as with express preemption, once a court decides that a
federal statute impliedly preempts state law, it must determine the substantive scope of preemption, e.g., whether FIFRA preempts all pesticiderelated laws or just labeling laws.
In the case of both express and implied preemption, a court must also
determine the scope of preemption with respect to the type of state law preempted: does the federal statute preempt only positive law enacted by the
states, or does it also preempt tort claims under each state’s common law?
An express preemption clause typically says that it preempts state “regulations,” “standards,” “requirements,” or “laws.” Courts must decide whether
the duties forming the basis for tort liability are “regulations,” “standards,”
“requirements,” or “laws,” as Congress intended those terms to be interpreted when it enacted the express preemption clause. For example, the
first question presented in Sprietsma was whether the duty alleged in the
tort claim was a “law or regulation” as those terms are used in the FBSA.41
39. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63, 64-65 (2002) (describing express and
implied preemption). The Supreme Court has not always been consistent in the terms it uses to describe
the different kinds of preemption. Frequently, the Court uses the term “conflict preemption” to include
the two kinds of preemption I have called “impossibility” and “obstacle.” I will use the latter terms to
keep the distinction between the two clear.
40. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 280 (1995); see also infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing Geier and Freightliner).
41. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 62-63.
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The same question arises under FIFRA: given that FIFRA’s express preemption clause preempts state labeling “requirements,” does FIFRA also
preempt tort claims related to pesticide labels, such as a claim for breach of
warranty or failure to warn? The question also arises when a court conducts
an implied preemption analysis: does allowing a particular tort claim to
proceed make it impossible to comply with federal law, create an obstacle
to achieving federal policies, or intrude on a field that Congress has occupied exclusively?
Because every federal statute has different language, structure, and
purpose, deciding its preemptive effect always requires an individualized
examination of the statute. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has articulated
several presumptions to guide its preemption analysis. First, the Court has
established a general presumption against preemption, at least in areas of
law traditionally regulated by the states.42 Second, even after it is clear that
a statute preempts some state law, the Court continues to apply this presumption against preemption to limit the substantive scope of preemption.43
FIFRA, for example, clearly preempts pesticide labeling requirements under state law, but it allows states to regulate the use of pesticides. If a particular state law falls into a gray area, so that a court is unsure whether it
regulates only pesticide use or whether it is also an attempt to regulate the
label,44 the court should apply the presumption against preemption and allow the state law to stand. The focus of this Article is a third presumption,
one that applies to the type of state law preempted. Once a court decides
that a federal statute preempts state regulation of a particular field through
positive law, should the court presume that tort claims in that field are also
preempted? Or should it adopt yet another presumption against preemption,
requiring additional evidence of specific congressional intent to preempt
the common law? The Supreme Court has done both at different points in
the development of its preemption jurisprudence, without clearly articulating a presumption in one direction or the other.45 In FIFRA cases, lower
courts have preferred the Court’s presumption in favor of preemption, holding that there is no meaningful difference between positive law and common law and that both must therefore be preempted. Sprietsma, however,

42. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), cited in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
418 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
43. Medtronic, 418 U.S. at 485.
44. For example, a state law might prohibit the residential use of a particular pesticide. The manufacturer would argue that this prohibition amounts to a regulation of the label since it suggests the label
should advise users not to apply the product in homes.
45. See Part II.B, infra.
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rejects this view and signals the Court’s intent to adhere to all three presumptions against preemption.
B. The Supreme Court Cases
Modern jurisprudence on preemption of common law claims begins
with Cipollone in 1992, but two earlier cases have continued to play key
roles as embodiments of competing philosophies about preemption of tort
liability. At important moments in the development of modern preemption
doctrine, the Court has looked to the 1959 decision in San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon46 when holding that common law claims are
preempted47 and to the 1984 decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation48 when holding that they are not.49
In Garmon, an employer brought a tort claim against a union for economic losses allegedly caused by peaceful picketing.50 The premise of the
tort claim was that organizing the picket was an unfair labor practice.51 The
Supreme Court held that this claim was preempted by the federal government’s broad authority under the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).52 This holding might be considered atypical of preemption
cases because the NLRA is a “strong” preempter, on par only with
ERISA53 in the strength and breadth of its preemptive force.54 But Garmon
became influential as precedent for its recognition of the regulatory role—
and thus the “preemptability”—of the common law.
Tort law aims not only at compensating victims but also at regulating
behavior through the threat of damages awards.55 The duty of care that
forms the basis for a tort action can thus be likened to a statute or other enactment of positive law. The Garmon Court relied on this analogy to hold
46. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
47. See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (citing Garmon). Cipollone is discussed infra at notes 7384 and accompanying text.
48. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
49. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (citing Silkwood). Medtronic is
discussed infra at notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
50. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237.
51. Id. at 245.
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
53. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
54. The strength of preemption under ERISA and the NLRA is evidenced primarily through removal doctrine. Normally, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal defense such as preemption
cannot serve as a basis for removal to federal court. Preemption under these two statutes, however, is so
complete that a complaint purporting to plead common law claims will be construed as stating a claim
under the federal law and can thus be removed. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)
(ERISA); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (NLRA).
55. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.
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that a state could no more regulate industrial relations through its tort law
than it could through its positive law.56 Hence state tort claims arising from
a labor dispute were preempted by federal law.57
The Court did not face another case involving preemption of common
law claims until Silkwood twenty-five years later. In Silkwood, the Court
held that the plaintiff could recover under state tort law for injuries caused
by negligent operation of a nuclear power plant, even though nuclear safety
is regulated exclusively by the federal Atomic Energy Commission.58 The
Court acknowledged the defendant’s reliance on Garmon and did not refute
its assertion that the common law has a regulatory function.59 The Court,
however, held that a federal law’s preemption of the common law should
not automatically mimic its preemption of positive law.60 There was no
question that the Atomic Energy Act preempted the state from enacting
statutes or administrative regulations governing the nuclear industry: although it contained no express preemption clause, Congress had concluded
the states were basically incompetent in this field of regulation, and it had
occupied the field.61 Nonetheless, the Court insisted on a distinction between regulation by common law and regulation by positive law. Applying
a presumption against preemption, the Court noted there was no specific
evidence that Congress had intended to preempt common law claims, while
there was some evidence that Congress had assumed the common law survived.62 Most importantly, Congress had not provided an alternative means
of redress for people injured by negligence in the nuclear industry. The
Court simply could not believe “that Congress would, without comment,
remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”63
Silkwood is an especially strong statement against preemption of
common law claims because the issue before the Court was limited to
56. See id. at 245.
57. Id.
58. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984).
59. Id. at 249.
60. See id. at 256.
61. Id. at 248-51.
62. Id. at 251-55. The Court noted that Congress had passed legislation establishing a government-backed indemnification and limited liability scheme available to nuclear facilities that obtained
insurance against the first $60 million in tort claims. The Senate Report on that legislation stated that
“the rights of third parties who are injured are established by State law.” Id. at 252 (quoting S. REP. NO.
85-296, at 9 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1810). Later amendments required nuclear
facilities to waive certain defenses they could otherwise assert in state tort actions. Id. at 253.
63. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251. Despite this reference to “illegal” conduct, the Court’s preemption
analysis did not limit the defendant’s liability to claims for negligence per se based on violations of federal regulations.
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whether punitive damages were preempted; the jury’s award of compensatory damages was unchallenged.64 Far from seeking to “remove all means
of judicial recourse,”65 the defendant challenged only that portion of the
judgment which was avowedly regulatory.66 The Court rejected the arguments of both the defendant and the government (appearing as amicus) and
noted there was no actual conflict with federal law since it was not physically impossible to pay both punitive damages and any fines imposed under
federal law.67 Having concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt
common law claims in general and that impossibility preemption did not
apply, the Court simply noted that punitive damages were an established
feature of tort law and that there was no specific evidence that Congress intended to eliminate them.68 The Court declined to find either field or obstacle preemption in the absence of concrete evidence of congressional intent
to preempt common law claims rather than just positive law.
Silkwood’s insistence on a distinction between positive and common
law at first seems inconsistent with Garmon’s treatment of them as equivalent. But the cases differ in whether a remedy was available for the wrongful conduct, and this difference was important to the Court.69 In Garmon,
the Court could rely on the broad authority of the National Labor Relations
Board to provide a remedy through its oversight of labor disputes and
power to enjoin unfair pickets,70 whereas in Silkwood there was no federal
relief available. Moreover, Garmon was limited to the narrow circumstances where the state tort duty arose directly from standards about what
constitutes an unfair labor practice.71 The Court made clear that tort law
would not be preempted in other labor disputes, for example those “marked
by violence and imminent threats to the public order,” because in those
situations the state’s compelling interest in preserving its own laws “is not

64. See id. at 246.
65. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 244-45 (quoting trial court’s instructions on punitive damages).
67. Id. at 257. In Silkwood, the Court did not appear even to consider whether the government’s
view on preemption was entitled to special weight. More recent cases have debated the degree of deference that should be afforded to the executive branch’s opinions about the preemptive scope of statutes
administered by executive agencies. This debate is discussed infra notes 181–191 and accompanying
text.
68. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255.
69. Compare id. at 251 (noting that Congress’s failure to provide remedy supported conclusion
that Congress did not intend to eliminate state remedies) with Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242 (explaining that
Congress had “entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative
agency”).
70. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246.
71. Id. at 239 (noting that state court had “held that those activities constituted a tort based on an
unfair labor practice under state law”).
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overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.”72
Thus, even under the strongly preemptive NLRA, most common law
claims are governed by the Silkwood rule and presumed to survive preemption. While Garmon says tort claims can be subjected to preemption analysis, Silkwood says that in the absence of clear evidence of preemptive intent, state law will survive and that the absence of a federal remedy is
evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt state remedies.
Despite having joined the majority in Silkwood, Justice Stevens cited
only Garmon when he authored the plurality opinion in Cipollone.73 Justice
Stevens’s Cipollone opinion staked out a middle ground between complete
preemption and no preemption based on close readings of the two preemption statutes at issue in that case: two different versions of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, later known as the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act.74 The 1965 version of the Act’s preemption clause
stated,
No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required [on cigarette packages or advertisements, except as provided by the federal
75
law].

In 1969, this clause was revised to state,
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the pro76
visions of this Act.

Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Stevens first concluded that the
1965 Act preempted only positive enactments of state law, leaving common law claims untouched.77 To the majority, the term “statements” implicitly referred to the type of warning requirement that Congress imposed
elsewhere in the same Act and thus appeared to preempt only similar enactments by States.78 Echoing though not citing Silkwood, the Court briefly
noted that there was “no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state
common-law damages actions.”79 Justice Stevens also wrote for the majority what might have been (if adhered to in later cases) an important new
rule for restricting preemption: where Congress has expressed its intentions
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 247.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. I 1965); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. V 1965-1969).
Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 § 5(b) (1965).
Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 § 5(b) (1969).
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519-20.
Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 518.
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through a preemption clause, the Court’s duty begins and ends with interpreting that clause.80 The Cipollone majority thus rejected the notion that
“implied preemption” could operate to preempt state law beyond Congress’s expressed intent.
Turning to the 1969 Act, Justice Stevens—writing no longer for a majority but for a plurality—quoted Garmon and emphasized the fungibility
of the common law and positive law as means for regulating conduct.81 He
found that the phrase “[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . under State law”
was a broad one and could reasonably be read to include common law
claims.82 Contrary to Silkwood, he stated that common law claims should
be deemed within the scope of the Act’s preemption clause unless there
was “good reason to believe” they were excluded.83 The Cipollone plurality
thus appeared to abandon Silkwood’s presumption against preemption of
common law claims. In doing so, it sowed the seeds of a presumption in
favor of preemption, based on a philosophical stance that saw no functional
difference between positive and common law. Although only three other
Justices joined this portion of Justice Stevens’s opinion, Justices Scalia and
Thomas disagreed with Justice Stevens only in that they felt he did not go
far enough, arguing that both versions of the Act preempted common law
claims.84
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Cipollone contained two innovations in
preemption law. First, Justice Stevens focused intensely on the language of
the express preemption clause, refusing to consider an implied preemption
analysis unmoored from Congress’s words. Second, he continued this close
examination of the text in deciding whether common law claims were preempted, without reference to Silkwood’s presumption against extending
preemption to include tort claims. Instead, the bulk of the Cipollone opinion relied on Garmon’s theory of the equivalence of positive and common
law. This second innovation could have expanded federal preemption beyond what Congress expected when it enacted the scores of federal statutes
that regulate areas of traditional state authority. But it was restrained by the
first innovation’s requirement to study the statutory language for signs of
congressional intent.
The Court soon repudiated Justice Stevens’s first innovation. In 1995
in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, a unanimous Court hinted that it could go
beyond an express preemption clause and apply implied preemption analy80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 517.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 520, 522.
Id. at 521 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
Id. at 548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
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sis even where Congress’s express preemptive intent did not extend to
common law claims.85 One year later, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court
flip-flopped again, re-embracing Justice Stevens’s first innovation and limiting its analysis of the Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the express terms of the statute.86 Once again, the Court was unanimous on this
point. But this vacillating unanimity evaporated in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., which came down heavily in favor of implied preemption even where an express preemption clause exists and does not contemplate preempting common law claims.87 Justice Stevens capitulated to the
new majority in Sprietsma, accepting that there may be implied preemption
even where Congress has expressly stated what should be preempted.88
Preemption doctrine thus lost the benefit of Justice Steven’s effort in Cipollone to tie the preemption analysis closely to Congress’s expressed intent.
This concession, however, enabled Justice Stevens to use Sprietsma to rein
in the expansion of his second innovation, which lower courts had carried
well beyond the bounds of Cipollone.
While the lower courts tended to ignore the first Cipollone innovation,
which operated to limit implied preemption, they embraced the second,
which expanded express preemption.89 In Medtronic, however, four years
after Cipollone, Justice Stevens wrote another plurality opinion, again highlighting the importance of focusing the preemption inquiry on Congress’s
intent.90 The Medtronic company sought to shield itself from liability for
injuries caused by a pacemaker, under the preemption clause of the MDA:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under [federal law] and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of
91
the device or to any other matter [covered by a federal requirement].

The company, modeling its arguments on Cipollone’s treatment of the 1969
Cigarette Act, claimed that because the word “requirement” is used in both
Acts, both should be construed to preempt common law duties as well as
positive law.92

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995).
518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996).
529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002) (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 869).
See supra notes 103-130 and accompanying text.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 479, 487 (1996).
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000).
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
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Despite his Cipollone opinion, Justice Stevens called this argument
“not only unpersuasive” but even “implausible.”93 This time he turned to
Silkwood, arguing the unlikelihood that Congress would have eliminated
tort liability for an entire industry without comment, especially since the
stated purpose of the MDA was the need for more oversight of that industry.94 Justice Stevens distinguished Cipollone, saying that the substantive
scope of the Cigarette Act was narrow, extending only to advertising and
promotion.95 Applying the same reasoning in Medtronic would have preempted a much wider range of claims, and Justice Stevens was not comfortable extinguishing so much common law and effectively immunizing an
entire industry without better evidence of Congress’s intent. Thus, Medtronic qualified Justice Stevens’s apparent proposal in Cipollone to disregard the Silkwood presumption against preempting common law claims,
even where preemption of positive law was clear. The drastic act of dispensing with the Silkwood presumption was appropriate only where the
class of tort claims thereby eliminated was narrow. This qualification also
helps explain Justice Stevens’s reliance on Garmon in his Cipollone opinion since Garmon explicitly stated that most tort claims would be preserved
unless Congress “clearly expressed” its desire to preempt them, and since
Garmon used the NLRA to preempt only a narrow class of claims.96 Justice
Stevens’s Medtronic opinion clarified that Cipollone’s reliance on Garmon,
and its abandonment of the Silkwood presumption, was appropriate only
because the preemptive effect was narrow.
Again, however, Justice Stevens wrote only for a plurality. The fifth
vote against preemption came from Justice Breyer, who wrote his own
opinion concurring in the judgment.97 While he did not reject a general presumption against preempting common law claims, Justice Breyer chafed at
the plurality’s suggestion that the MDA categorically did not preempt
common law claims. He insisted that some common law claims would be
preempted.98 As an example, he imagined a federal regulation that required
a hearing aid to have a two-inch wire, while a state court action alleged
negligence or design defect for failure to use a one-inch wire. Surely, he
argued, such a claim would be preempted.99 Justice Breyer’s view prevailed
in Geier, where his opinion for the Court held that under the National Traf-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 488-89.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 502 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 504-05 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act100 a tort claim for failure to install an airbag was implicitly preempted because it posed an obstacle to federal policy
that airbags be phased-in gradually rather than installed all at once.101
In Geier and Sprietsma, the Court at last concluded that it will apply
its implied preemption doctrine even where an express clause exists. The
Court has even at times found it more convenient to give only cursory
treatment—or none at all—to a statute’s express preemption clause, focusing instead on the Court’s own analysis of what kinds of state law activity
might conflict with federal goals.102 Until Sprietsma, the Court had offered
little further guidance on express preemption beyond the confusing array of
opinions in Cipollone and Medtronic.
C. Lower Court Responses in FIFRA Cases
Cipollone and Medtronic dominate lower court decisions on FIFRA
preemption. Before Cipollone, federal courts were split on FIFRA preemption. The D.C. Circuit had ruled against preemption of common law claims,
echoing Silkwood in its concern not to eliminate tort liability just because
the federal government had taken over the role of establishing minimum
safety standards.103 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this view and argued that
positive law and common law were equivalent, and both were preempted.104 But after Cipollone, FIFRA preemption swept the courts.105 Like
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (repealed 1994).
101. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864-866 (2000).
102. See, e.g., id. at 867-69 (briefly discussing express preemption before considering implied preemption); see also Davis, supra note 3, at 1007 (discussing Geier’s cursory treatment of express preemption clause); Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (finding implied preemption without any discussion of MDA’s express preemption clause).
103. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
104. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and jmt. vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). The Papas court noted that Ferebee was the only other court of appeals
decision on FIFRA preemption and that the district courts were divided in their opinions on the issue.
Id. at 1021 n. 1 (citing district court cases). The Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in
favor of preemption and remanded for reconsideration in light of Cipollone. On remand, the Eleventh
Circuit adhered to its original holding, and certiorari was denied. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516
(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 (1993).
105. All six federal courts of appeals to consider FIFRA preemption in the four years after Cipollone concluded that it preempted at least some common law claims. Welchert v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc.,
59 F.3d 69, 75 (8th Cir. 1995); Taylor Ag Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1995);
MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1994); Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 5
F.3d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1993); Ark.-Platte & Gulf P’ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177,
1179 (10th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993). The supreme courts of
eleven states agreed. McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Co., 947 P.2d 474, 477 (Mont. 1997), overruled
by Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000); Schuver v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 546 N.W.2d 610, 612-16 (Iowa 1996); Hopkins v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 666 So.2d
615, 619-22 (La. 1996); Eide v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 542 N.W.2d 769, 771-72 (S.D. 1996);
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the 1969 Cigarette Act at issue in Cipollone, FIFRA uses a form of the
word “requirement” in its preemption clause:
[A] State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under
106
this subchapter.

Even more important than this textual similarity was Cipollone’s suggestion that there is no meaningful difference between regulation through positive law and regulation through the tort system.107 Lower courts have repeated this principle like a mantra in FIFRA cases without recognizing the
narrow bounds placed on it in Garmon.108
The sweeping effect of Cipollone on FIFRA preemption cases is a
striking example of how a nuanced Supreme Court decision can be applied
simplistically by lower courts seeking doctrinal guidance. Cipollone was
hardly an enthusiastic endorsement of preemption; it held that one preemption clause did not preempt common law claims while the other preempted
some, but not all. Lower courts, however, seized on the word “requirement” as a similarity between the preempting 1969 Cigarette Act and
FIFRA and ignored a different form of the same word—”required”—in the
non-preempting 1965 Cigarette Act.109 Justice Stevens reached opposite
conclusions about these two versions of the Cigarette Act based not on this
single word but on a close reading of the entire statute. His opinion in Medtronic and his reliance on Garmon make clear he was influenced by the fact
that only a small class of claims would be barred if he found preemption.110
That factor, however, was not immediately clear in his Cipollone opinion,
nor was it a factor for lower courts busily clearing their dockets of pesticide
cases. “Cipollone” became shorthand for the simple syllogism that the
word “requirements” in preemption clauses undoubtedly includes enactHochberg v. Zoecon Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1263, 1265-67 (Mass. 1995); Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898
S.W.2d 819, 820-21 (Tex. 1995); Goodwin v. Bacon, 896 P.2d 673, 681 (Wash. 1995); Gorton v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 533 N.W.2d 746, 753, 754 n. 8 (Wis. 1995)Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d
671, 676 (Ga. 1994); Jenkins v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 888 P.2d 869, 873-84 (Kan. 1994); Davidson v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 937 (Nev. 1992).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000).
107. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992).
108. See, e.g., Ark.-Platte & Gulf P’ship, 981 F.2d at 1179 (“Indeed, a state common law duty to
warn is nothing more than a duty to label a product to provide information. In that sense, the common
law duty is no less a “requirement” in the preemption scheme than a state statute imposing the same
burden.”). See also Nelson, supra note 26, at 584 (“Cipollone’s rejection of a distinction between common law damage actions and positive legal enactments has had significant consequences for the FIFRA
preemption controversy.”).
109. See, e.g., MacDonald, 27 F.3d at 1024 (“If the encompassing words of the statute standing
alone do not convince the skeptics, surely Cipollone leaves no doubt but that the FIFRA term ‘any requirements’ makes no distinction between positive enactments and the common law.”).
110. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486-89 (1996); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
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ments of positive state law; positive and common law are equivalent; therefore, common law claims are preempted.111
Once this reading of Cipollone became entrenched in FIFRA litigation, the question became not whether common law claims were preempted, but which claims were preempted. In Cipollone, Justice Stevens
had used his close reading of the Cigarette Act to identify which claims fell
within the substantive reach of the preemption clause.112 In Cipollone, that
meant “failure to warn” claims were preempted since they rested on a state
law duty “based on smoking and health.”113 Other claims, however, were
not preempted. An express warranty claim was based on general contract
law, not on smoking and health, and thus was not preempted.114 Further
complicating the matter, Justice Stevens found that a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation was partially preempted, depending on the particular factual allegations and duty of care alleged by the plaintiff.115 Courts have followed a similar approach in FIFRA preemption cases, usually holding that
failure-to-warn claims are preempted but design defect claims are not.116
The intricacy of this analysis, however, opened the door to a creeping
expansion of preemption: in FIFRA cases, it boils down to a litigation
strategy by the pesticide industry that recasts all claims as essentially about
the labels.117 Suppose a plaintiff alleges a pesticide was defectively designed because it was unreasonably dangerous when used, as intended, in
homes, offices, and other indoor places where people breathe. Says the de-

111. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 584-85 (“Cipollone must be seen to clearly repudiate Ferebee’s permissive approach to state damage actions.”).
112. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-30.
113. Id. at 524-25.
114. Id. at 525-27.
115. Justice Stevens indicated that claims based on misrepresentations in advertising or promotional materials were preempted, except to the extent that there were actual, intentional misstatements of
material fact. A fraudulent misrepresentation claim could also be based on the failure to disclose material facts through channels other than advertising or promotion, such as to a state regulatory agency.
The rationale for these distinctions was that the text of the preemption clause limited its scope to “advertising or promotion” and that the general duty not to make false statements of material fact could be
applied in this context without thereby becoming a “requirement . . . based on smoking and health.” Id.
at 527-29.
116. Nelson, supra note 26, at 586 (summarizing areas of agreement among lower courts addressing FIFRA preemption after Cipollone).
117. See, e.g., Grenier v. Verm. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 564-65 (1st Cir. 1996) (accepting
defendant’s argument that design defect claim, premised on product being unreasonably dangerous
when used in foreseeable manner, to control pests in private homes, was preempted because it was “effectively no more than an attack on the failure to warn against residential use”); Sleath v. West Mont
Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042, 1043-44, 1053 (Mont. 2000) (noting defendant’s argument that
even design defect claims were preempted); see also infra note 118 (citing cases involving arguments
that claims for breach of express warranty are preempted).
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fendant, “What you really mean is that the label should have warned you
not to use it in homes or offices without adequate ventilation. Your ‘design
defect’ claim is merely a failure-to-warn claim in disguise.” This argument
has the same easy appeal as the argument that tort law is just positive law
in disguise, and the pesticide industry has had some success pushing the
boundaries of preemption through this reasoning.118 But the further it is
pushed, the more FIFRA preemption threatens a broad class of claims as in
Silkwood, rather than a narrow class as in Garmon. Indeed, this overreaching may have prompted a few courts to re-examine their position on FIFRA
preemption in light of Medtronic.119
In most jurisdictions, Medtronic has not affected FIFRA preemption.
Even though Medtronic also involved the word “requirement” and found
no preemption, most courts have not been moved to revisit FIFRA for a
closer analysis; instead, they have continued to rely on their Cipollonebased preemption holdings.120 But as FIFRA preemption spread, the EPA
got involved. In 1999 it submitted a brief in a California case in which it
undertook a comprehensive analysis of FIFRA, as Justice Stevens had done
for the Cigarette Act and the MDA but which lower courts had failed to do
in simplistically applying only a portion of Cipollone to FIFRA.121 Mimicking Justice Stevens’s discussion of the 1965 Cigarette Act, the EPA showed
that, throughout FIFRA, the word “requirements” is used to refer to positive law.122 The EPA drew on Medtronic and Silkwood to show that there
was no specific congressional intent to extinguish tort liability, and that
118. For example, courts have split on whether express warranty claims are preempted. Some
courts have held that all warranty claims are preempted because the warranty appears on the label. E.g.,
Grenier v. Verm. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 564 (1st Cir. 1996); Taylor Ag. Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54
F.3d 555, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l, 47 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1994); McAlpine
v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Co., 947 P.2d 474, 478 (Mont. 1997), overruled by Sleath v. West Mont Home
Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000); Clubine v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 534 N.W.2d 385, 387
(Iowa 1995). Others have held that a warranty was preempted to the extent the EPA mandated the warranty but not preempted to the extent the EPA merely approved the inclusion on the label of a warranty
proposed by the manufacturer. Welchert v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 73 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995);
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1993); United AGRI Prods. v. Kawamata Farms,
Inc., 948 P.2d 1055, 1078-80 (Haw. 1997); Higgins v. Monsanto Co., 862 F.Supp. 751, 760-61
(N.D.N.Y. 1994). None of these courts has grappled with the absurdity of a system under which a warranty is either mandated or approved but is unenforceable.
119. In the Montana case, for example, the lower court had held that all the plaintiffs’ tort claims
were preempted, even a claim for design defect, and the state supreme court expressed concern about
the breadth of preemption claimed by the defendant. Sleath, 16 P.3d at 1043-44, 1053.
120. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 1999); Kuiper v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 131 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1997); Grenier v. Verm. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1st Cir.
1996).
121. Br. Amicus Curiae for the U.S. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Etcheverry v. TRI-AG
Serv. Inc., No. S072524 (Cal.) (filed March 1999).
122. Id. at 14-17.
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there was some evidence Congress assumed the common law would survive.123 Although the California Supreme Court rejected the EPA’s analysis,124 Montana embraced it in Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Services,
Inc.125 Overruling a prior decision, Sleath held that FIFRA’s preemption
clause does not apply to common law actions for damages.126 But the Montana court’s reliance on the EPA brief may have come just in time for the
Sleath plaintiffs, as this brief was itself short-lived.
Sleath was decided in December 2000, around the same time a new
president, more inclined to favor the pesticide industry over tort plaintiffs,
was selected. In May 2003, the U.S. Solicitor General submitted a brief on
a certiorari petition in a FIFRA preemption case from Texas.127 In that
brief, the (Bush) government repudiated its prior (Clintonian) brief and
embraced the lower court authority holding that FIFRA preemption includes common law claims.128 Like those lower court decisions, the government’s reasoning was based primarily on the theory that there is no coherent distinction between positive and common law.129 Until Sprietsma,
Montana and Oregon stood alone in rejecting this theory and refusing to
believe that the Congress that enacted FIFRA had, “without comment, remove[d] all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”130
For those who read the tea leaves of the Court’s grants of certiorari,
the grant in Bates v. Dow bodes well for Montana, Oregon, and FIFRA
plaintiffs. Heedless of Sprietsma, the government has continued to argue its
new theory that FIFRA preempts common law claims when commenting
on certiorari petitions in FIFRA preemption cases. In its first amicus brief
announcing its new position, the government suggested that certiorari
might be appropriate but for the fact that the petition was premature, thus
depriving the Court of jurisdiction.131 But in Bates, where the lower court
favored the defendant, the government argued against certiorari, noting
that almost all lower courts had accepted the preemption argument and por-

123. Id. at 23-32.
124. Etcheverry v. TRI-AG Serv. Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000).
125. 16 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2000).
126. Id. at 1047-48, 1048-49, 1050, 1052 (referring to the Etcheverry brief).
127. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, Case No. 02-367 (U.S.).
128. Id. at 17. The problems with this theory are discussed in Part III.B infra.
129. Id. at 18-19.
130. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
131. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, Case No. 02-367 (U.S.)
(stating that petition “raises potentially important questions” regarding FIFRA preemption but that
lower court decision was not final judgment).
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traying Montana as an insignificant anomaly.132 Statistically, of course, the
Supreme Court tends to grant certiorari in the cases it is inclined to reverse
rather than those it is inclined to affirm.133 The grant in Bates, especially
against the government’s recommendation, may thus be an indication that
the Court plans to stick to its Sprietsma guns, once again upsetting the settled view of most lower courts (including the Fifth Circuit in Bates) in favor of preemption.
One wild card, though, is the government’s own flip-flop. The weight
accorded to the executive branch’s opinion about preemption has been an
increasingly important theme of preemption cases, a theme especially emphasized by Justice Breyer.134 In addition, Bates concerns claims that a pesticide did not work as promised, causing crop damage, not claims of personal injury from exposure to a pesticide. It thus raises an issue similar to
the issue in Sprietsma regarding the scope of preemption when an agency
has authority to enact potentially preemptive regulations but has not done
so. It may have been this issue, rather than FIFRA per se or the theoretical
differences between common law and positive law, that piqued the Court’s
interest in Bates. Depending on how the Court resolves those issues, it may
avoid a broad holding on FIFRA preemption.
III. SPRIETSMA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR FIFRA
Despite its rejection of the reasoning of many FIFRA preemption
cases, Sprietsma by itself was unlikely to lead the lower courts en masse to
reconsider prior holdings that FIFRA preempts common law claims. Particularly in the federal courts of appeals, the fact that Sprietsma involved a
different statute would probably have been enough for most courts to adhere to their prior rulings based on stare decisis and the rule against overruling the decision of a prior panel.135 But as the Supreme Court considers
the question of FIFRA preemption in Bates, the principles set out unani-

132. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 18-19, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, Case No. 03388. The Bates brief did not mention the Oregon decision in Brown v. Charles H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d
846 (Or. App. 1999), review denied, 6 P.3d 1098 (Or. 2000).
133. Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA.
L. REV. 727, 742 n. 66 (2001) (noting that Supreme Court “routinely reverses or vacates twice as many
cases as it affirms”).
134. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000) (“We place some weight
upon [the Department of Transportation’s] interpretation of [regulatory] objectives and its conclusion,
as set forth in the Government’s [amicus] brief, that a tort suit such as this one would ‘“stan[d] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution”‘ of those objectives.”). See also infra notes 181–191and
accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Santamaria v. Horsely, 110 F.3d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1997) (“It is settled law that
one three-judge panel . . . cannot ordinarily reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.”).
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mously in Sprietsma should lead it to conclude that FIFRA preempts very
few, if any, common law claims. The Court should hold that FIFRA’s express preemption clause does not apply to common law claims and that implied preemption arises only in “impossibility” cases, where the common
law duty alleged in a state lawsuit would require that federal law be violated.
A. FIFRA’s Express Preemption Clause
The starting point for any preemption analysis is the text of the potentially preemptive federal statute. In Cipollone and Medtronic—and again in
Sprietsma—Justice Stevens scrutinized the statutory text for evidence of
whether Congress intended to preempt common law claims as well as enactments of positive law.136 In FIFRA’s case the text and the legislative history support an inference that Congress did not intend to preempt common
law claims. Because, however, there is no clear statement one way or the
other in the text, it is critical which presumption one adopts: a presumption
that common law is equivalent to positive law, and thus presumed to be
preempted, or a presumption against expanding the scope of preemption
automatically to include common law merely because positive law has
been preempted. As we shall see, Sprietsma adopts the latter presumption,
rightly recognizing a meaningful distinction between common law and
positive law.137 But first, this section sets forth the textual argument that
FIFRA’s express preemption clause does not encompass common law actions.
A casual reader of the many judicial decisions finding broad FIFRA
preemption of state law would be surprised to discover that the so-called
FIFRA preemption clause is actually subsumed within a provision that expressly reserves power to the States:
§ 136v. Authority of States.
(a) In general. A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the
regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.
(b) Uniformity. Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
138
those required under this subchapter.

Taken as a whole, this provision is better described as a qualified saving
clause rather than as a preemption clause. Subsection (a) plainly refers to
136. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 486-91 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. See Part III.B, infra.
138. 7 U.S.C. § 136v.
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positive enactments by the State. While the first clause of (a) could, in the
abstract, be understood to permit both positive and common law “regulation” of the sale or use of pesticides, the “but only . . .” clause cannot naturally or even coherently be understood in that fashion. In order for a common law “regulation” to “not permit” a particular sale or use of a pesticide,
a state would have to be required to impose tort liability for such a sale or
use. If Congress had wanted to create tort-like remedies for violations of
FIFRA, it would have done so directly, not by trying to mandate liability
under state law. The natural reading of subsection (a) – as referring exclusively to positive law – is also the only possible reading.
Before moving on to subsection (b), it is worth pausing to consider
one possible implication of this argument. The purpose of a saving clause is
to foreclose preemption that might otherwise be inferred (under principles
of implied preemption) from FIFRA’s comprehensive regulation of pesticides. I have just argued that subsection (a), FIFRA’s saving clause, does
not refer to common law claims. Does this mean that common law claims
based on sale or use violations are preempted, even though positive law is
“saved”? To the contrary, the statute is clear that states have primary enforcement responsibility for both state and federal rules for pesticide use, as
long as the State regime is at least as stringent as the federal one.139 The
point is not that Congress was drawing a distinction between positive law
and common law but that it was not even thinking about common law in
this context. The common law tort system is ancillary to, not directly part
of, the regulatory system that was Congress’s focus in drafting FIFRA.140
Turning, then, to subsection (b), its most salient feature is that its
scope is limited to qualification of subsection (a). It opens “Such State . . .,”
meaning “a state that is exercising the regulatory authority reserved to it by
subsection (a).”141 This context compels the conclusion that when it prohibited any State labeling “requirements,” Congress was contemplating requirements that might be imposed on labels in the course of State regulation of sale or use. After all, in the absence of subsection (b), a State
enacting a prohibition on a particular use of a pesticide might well “require” that this prohibition be mentioned on the label. This relationship between subsections (a) and (b) strongly suggests that the word “requirements” in subsection (b) refers only to positive law.

139. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).
140. See The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 24 (a), 86
Stat. 973, 997 (1972).
141. Id.
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This context also explains the use of the word “requirements” in subsection (b) rather than “rule” or “regulation,” each of which more strongly
connotes positive law.142 Subsection (a) authorizes particular categories of
“regulations,” while subsection (b) is concerned with particular features or
“requirements” that might be part of those regulations. It would be unnatural to use the word “regulation” again in subsection (b) where a different
meaning was intended. “Requirements” is a natural alternative that does not
necessarily refer to common law duties, and in this context clearly does not
do so.
The conclusion that § 136v(b) does not preempt common law claims
is reinforced by a thorough review of FIFRA’s text and legislative history
presented by the EPA in its original amicus brief on this issue. Citing Medtronic, which examined how the word “requirements” was used throughout
the statute at issue, the EPA noted the normal rule of statutory construction
that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning.143 The EPA then counted seventy-five uses of the
word “requirements” in FIFRA, each plainly referring only to positive
law.144 As in Medtronic, the EPA concluded, the statute’s “focus is . . .
positive law by legislative or administrative bodies, not the application of
general rules of common law by judges and juries.”145 A similarly exhaustive review of FIFRA’s extensive legislative history revealed no intent or
expectation that tort liability would be preempted.146 To the contrary, as in
Silkwood, what evidence exists suggests that tort liability was preserved.
For example, the EPA’s General Counsel testified, “The bill does not affect
tort liability.”147 As the Supreme Court observed in Medtronic, if Congress

142. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519 (1992) (“Read against the backdrop of
regulatory activity undertaken by state legislatures and federal agencies . . . , the term ‘regulation’ most
naturally refers to positive enactments by those bodies, not to common-law damages actions.”).
143. Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Etcheverry v.
TRI-AG Serv. Inc., No. S072524 (Cal.) (filed March 1999) (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484
(1990)).
144. Id. at 14-16.
145. Id. at 17 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489 (1996)).
146. Id. at 23-32. The EPA reviewed over 2,300 pages of transcripts from 26 days of hearings held
by three congressional committees; over 300 pages of committee reports; and over 150 pages of transcripts from the five days of floor debate. Id. at 23-24. Out of 250 witnesses, including 36 from the pesticide industry, three of the industry representatives mentioned product liability suits against their companies, but there was no suggestion that they would be protected from suits in the future. Id. at 28.
During the floor debates, the Senate version of the bill prevailed over the House version. The latter
would have prohibited the states from regulating certain pesticides more strictly than the EPA. Id. at 3132. Congress also debated an indemnity provision, and members were assured that it would not apply to
common law tort actions that might be brought against pesticide manufacturers. Id. at 32.
147. Id. at 28.
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intended the opposite result, “its failure even to hint at it is spectacularly
odd.”148
As discussed above, the vast majority of courts (and the EPA under
the Bush administration) have refused even to engage in this statutory
analysis in order to determine the scope of FIFRA’s express preemption
clause.149 Rather than analyze the statute, courts have relied on the equation
of common law and positive law to erase any distinction between them
with respect to preemption. Sprietsma rejects this easy approach and, by
insisting that common law claims be considered separately, will require
courts to analyze FIFRA and other federal statutes closely before deciding
their preemptive scope.150
B. The Return of Compensation
Sprietsma’s unanimous statement that “[i]t would have been perfectly
rational for Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims, which—unlike
most administrative and legislative regulations—necessarily perform an
important remedial role in compensating accident victims”151 reinstated the
presumption against preemption of common law claims and signaled a return to Silkwood’s concern for preserving remedies and preserving state authority. Of course, even discounting the Court’s history of erratic holdings
on preemption, the ruling against preemption by the FBSA does not compel
the same outcome for FIFRA: the language and structure of the two Acts
are of course different. What Sprietsma does suggest, however, is that the
Supreme Court will decide the question of FIFRA preemption without the
facile assumptions that have led so many courts to use FIFRA broadly to
preempt state common law.
Those assumptions are pinned to an enthusiastic acceptance of the
theory of positive law–common law equivalence set forth in Garmon and
expanded in Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Cipollone.152 While it is
certainly true that the common law regulates behavior, Silkwood and
Sprietsma recognized that the common law’s role in compensating victims
is equally well-established and important.153 In recent years, several industries have tried to convince Congress to give them explicit federal immunity from state tort law; their attempts have sparked intense political con148. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 490.
149. See Part II.C, supra.
150. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002).
151. Id.
152. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992).
153. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984); Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 70.
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troversy and public debate about the role of the tort system and the merits
of having Congress take control of it.154 Regardless of the outcome of those
debates, their intensity underscores the unlikelihood that the Congress that
enacted FIFRA believed it was extinguishing significant areas of tort liability. To hold that FIFRA broadly preempts common law claims is to hold
that what is now a question of great debate about “tort reform” was accomplished implicitly and without comment in 1972, when FIFRA’s preemption clause became law.155
In addition to advancing the separate goal of compensation, the tort
system regulates by a different means from positive law. The threat of tort
liability means a manufacturer of a potentially dangerous product cannot
assume that a government seal of approval has immunized it from future
liability. Traditionally, that uncertainty was seen as a good thing: compliance with government regulations was not a defense to a negligence action.156 It is simply too much to expect the government to make every necessary safety decision in a timely fashion, as the Coast Guard’s
bureaucratic delay in Sprietsma demonstrates.157 It also makes no sense to
immunize the entity that is the primary source of information about the
product. While federal regulators may be more skilled and have more resources than state regulators, a jury, despite its lack of expertise, will often
have more information than was available to federal or state regulators at
the time they approved a particular safety standard. The common law regulates by giving the party in the best position to take safety precautions an
incentive to do so, rather than foisting the entire burden of protecting consumers onto government agencies. The common law’s compensatory role
and its unique form of regulation make it meaningfully different from positive law.
While Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Cipollone relied on Garmon and emphasized the similarities between regulation through positive
and common law, it should not have been read as an all-out endorsement of
their equivalence, as his follow-up opinion in Medtronic made clear. Although lower courts have reached near-universal agreement that Cipollone

154. See, e.g., Maria Newman, New Jersey Doctors Find Unity in Fight to Limit Malpractice
Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at B3 (discussing attempts by New Jersey doctors, including a
threatened strike, to force medical malpractice reform legislation); Y2K Liability Limits, N.Y.TIMES,
July 3, 1999, at A10 (discussing the political struggle surrounding legislation to limit liability for potential “Y2K” computer failures).
155. Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 24, 86 Stat. 997 (1972).
156. See Reporters’ Study: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, Vol. 2, 83-84 (Am. L. Inst. Ed., 1991); see also Nelson, supra
note 26, at 571-72 (discussing pros and cons of dual remedial systems).
157. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 62.
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compelled FIFRA preemption of common law claims, in Sprietsma Justice
Stevens finally had the opportunity to right this wrong and return to Silkwood’s presumption against preemption of common law claims.
C. The Importance of a Saving Clause?
One important factor in Sprietsma, as in several of the Court’s recent
preemption cases, was the presence of a “saving clause” expressly limiting
the preemption clause, thereby preserving liability under the common
law.158 Does FIFRA’s lack of a similar saving clause require the conclusion
that common law claims against pesticide manufacturers are not saved but
preempted?
The Sprietsma Court stated that the FBSA’s saving clause “buttresse[d]” its conclusion, suggesting that the clause was not necessary to
the Court’s conclusion.159 The Court analyzed the language of the preemption clause separately from the saving clause, turning to the latter only as
reassurance that it had correctly interpreted the statute by reading the preemption clause narrowly.160 The Court also noted that the saving clause
supported its position that it was reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to preempt positive law but not common law since the saving clause
focused on preserving private damages remedies.161
FIFRA’s saving clause is of a different sort. Recall that FIFRA’s saving clause preserves the authority of states to make certain categories of
substantive regulations: “A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent
the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.”162 The combination of this saving clause with the preemption clause
means that states may regulate the sale and use of pesticides even if they
cannot impose labeling requirements.
A state thus has a back-door method of disagreeing with federal labeling requirements: if a state believes the EPA has not required sufficiently
stringent safety warnings on a particular pesticide, it can ban the pesticide
altogether through positive law. Although the state might not always
choose this drastic step, if it does so, nothing in FIFRA makes the validity
of the ban hinge on the state’s motive; so long as the ban is directed at the
sale or use of the pesticide, it is within the saving clause.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 64.
7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).
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As a practical matter, if a large state believed more stringent labels
were needed, it could use the threat of a complete ban to convince the
manufacturer to submit a revised label for EPA approval. This scenario
shows the incoherence of preempting common law claims by dissecting
which claims are “really” about the label and which are independent of the
label. A state is free under FIFRA to use positive law to ban the sale of a
pesticide if it considers the warnings on the label inadequate. Why, then,
should the same state be precluded from imposing tort liability under the
same circumstances?
A saving clause should not be necessary to save common law claims
from preemption when there is no evidence Congress intended to preempt
anything beyond competing positive law enactments from the states. Congress knows that it acts against a backdrop of tort liability.163 Courts should
neither presume Congress meant to alter that backdrop nor require Congress to include a special saving clause in order to preserve common law
claims. In FIFRA’s case, assuming the equivalence of positive law and
common law can lead either to preempting common law claims or to preserving them, depending on whether one focuses on the preemption clause
or the saving clause. FIFRA is thus an excellent example of why courts
should not assume such equivalence and should adhere to the Silkwood presumption against preemption of common law claims.
D. Implied Preemption: Lingering Distrust of State Courts and Juries
In addition to returning to Silkwood and recognizing the independent
status of the common law, Sprietsma solidified the emerging majority view
on applying implied preemption doctrine even when a statute contains an
express preemption clause. In Cipollone and Medtronic, Justice Stevens eschewed the implied preemption analysis, limiting himself to interpretation
of Congress’s stated intent.164 The contrary majority view, which Justice
Stevens accepted and incorporated into his opinion in Sprietsma,165 reflects
an unfortunate distrust of juries and state court judges It holds the potential
for repeating past mistakes by authorizing ever-expanding preemption unmoored from congressional intent; however, Justice Stevens also suggested
some limitations, again based on a distinction between positive law and
common law.166 While still engaging in the implied preemption analysis in
163. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988); Fairfax’s Devisee v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812) (stating that common law doctrines “ought not to
be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose”).
164. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-531; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 503 (1996).
165. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 70.
166. Id. at 69-70.
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order to ensure any cases of “impossibility” preemption are addressed, Justice Stevens would require clear evidence of congressional intent to preempt common law in addition to positive law under “field” or “obstacle”
preemption.167
The Court’s strongest advocate of the need for implied preemption is
Justice Breyer. In Medtronic, he argued the Court should not exempt common law claims from preemption without leaving the possibility of preempting tort claims that directly conflicted with federal rules.168 It is worth
giving closer attention to the hypothetical hearing aid example he offered:
Imagine that, in respect to a particular hearing aid component, a federal
MDA regulation requires a 2-inch wire, but a state agency regulation requires a 1-inch wire. If the federal law, embodied in the “2-inch” MDA
regulation, preempts the state “1-inch” agency regulation, why would it
not similarly pre-empt a state-law tort action that premises liability upon
the defendant manufacturer’s failure to use a 1-inch wire (say, an award
by a jury persuaded by expert testimony that use of a more than 1-inch
169
wire is negligence)?

The litigation envisioned by this example requires, first, a plaintiff’s lawyer
willing to allege that the defendant was negligent for failing to break federal law; second, a trial judge who will rule, on a motion for summary
judgment, that a reasonable jury could find the defendant negligent for failing to break federal law; third, a jury that will so find; and fourth, appellate
courts that will affirm such a verdict. Granting the existence of audacious
plaintiffs’ lawyers and judges asleep at the wheel, it is still hard to imagine
the convergence of all these requirements in a single case. Perhaps preemption doctrine needs a safety valve in case they do, but that small possibility
warrants only a safety valve, not wholesale preemption of tort law.
Of the three kinds of implied preemption—impossibility preemption,
obstacle preemption, and field preemption—Justice Breyer’s example is
one of impossibility. As a formal matter, there is nothing wrong with applying impossibility preemption to common law claims, in recognition of
the theoretical possibility of a rogue judge and jury punishing a defendant
for obeying federal law. Justice Breyer, however, uses the example to justify applying the full range of implied preemption doctrine. But the example does not support applying field or obstacle preemption to common law
claims in cases where an express preemption clause exists and does not
clearly preempt those claims. If interpretation of the express preemption
clause results in preservation of common law claims, how can Congress

167. Id.
168. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 504.
169. Id.
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have intended to occupy the field, and how can allowing common law
claims create an obstacle to Congress’s goals?
A problem inherent in field and obstacle preemption of common law
claims is that they require courts to assess competing legislative goals.
Many federal safety laws try to create uniform, national standards and increase safety and oversight of the industry. Congress’s job is to balance
these competing interests, but too often the Court has relied solely on the
need for uniformity and thus preempted tort claims without any evidence of
how Congress might have struck the balance.170 Implied preemption analysis thus draws courts into the legislative task of fine-tuning remedies to
achieve specific policy goals. While this may be inevitable where Congress
has not provided guidance through an express preemption clause, it should
be avoided in cases where Congress has already spoken.
Although the Court has now made clear that the existence of an express preemption clause does not preclude application of its implied preemption doctrine,171 Sprietsma hints at a limitation on this rule. Justice Stevens, of course, argued in Cipollone and Medtronic that implied
preemption analysis had no place where Congress had already expressly
stated its preemptive intent.172 Although in Sprietsma he acceded to Justice
Breyer’s arguments in favor of a safety valve, he adhered to his own views
by treating the existence of the express preemption clause as creating at
least a presumption against implied preemption:
The FBSA might be interpreted as expressly occupying the field with respect to state positive laws and regulations but its structure and framework do not convey a clear and manifest intent to go even further and
implicitly pre-empt all state common law relating to boat manufacture.
Rather, our conclusion that the Act’s express preemption clause does not
173
cover common-law claims suggests the opposite intent.

Thus Justice Stevens treated the “field” of providing remedies for unsafe
boat manufacture as separate from the “field” of governing boat manufacture through positive law and required separate evidence of preemptive intent, just as he had when analyzing the express preemption clause. Congress would not be presumed to have occupied one field merely because it
had occupied the other. That the rest of the Court, including Justice Breyer,
joined in this analysis suggests that a compromise has been struck.

170. See Davis, supra note 3, at 1016-18 (“The perceived need for uniformity of standards is, and
has always been, a critical factor to the Court in evaluating whether a state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of federal objectives.”).
171. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 65 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
172. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 470, 518 (1992); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 499.
173. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69.
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This compromise avoids an absolute ban on implied preemption where
an express preemption clause exists, thus alleviating Justice Breyer’s concern that state tort law could impose a duty in direct conflict with federal
law. At the same time, it avoids the approach suggested by Geier, which
renders Congress’s words and intent superfluous, passing by express preemption clauses in favor of the Court’s own policy analysis under the rubric of implied preemption. As the Court explained in Myrick, a presumption against “field” or “obstacle” preemption beyond the scope of an
express preemption clause is merely an application of “a familiar canon of
statutory construction.”174
Sprietsma thus represents an important opportunity for cabining the
implied preemption analysis to a safety valve against direct, “impossible”
conflicts, where it is impossible to obey both state and federal law. “Field”
and “obstacle” preemption of common law claims would be rejected unless
the Court found that Congress’s “clear and manifest intent” was to preempt
common law claims. If evidence of such intent is not discovered in the
course of analyzing the express preemption clause, it is unlikely to emerge
as a basis for implied preemption—at least not if the Court’s analysis is
limited to the text of the statute and its legislative history, the traditional
sources of evidence of congressional intent.
E. Post Script: Chevron, Skidmore, and Political Preemption
In recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly looked
beyond the text and legislative history to a new source of information regarding the proper preemptive scope of a statute: the opinions of the
agency charged with enforcing the statute.175 I have argued above that, under Sprietsma, if an express preemption clause is found to be narrow and
not to apply to common law claims, then the Court should presume that
common law claims are not preempted and invoke implied preemption only
in cases of impossibility. Because the Court should already have examined
Congress’s intent in its analysis of the express preemption clause, this presumption against any significant role for implied preemption is unlikely to
be rebutted by some new evidence of congressional intent that, for some
reason, was not considered in interpreting the express preemption clause.
The more likely source of new evidence is the administrative agency’s
statements to the Court, probably in the form of an amicus brief, that allowing tort claims to proceed would interfere with its ability to achieve Congress’s goals.

174. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995).
175. E.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-86 (2000).
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In Silkwood, the government made this very argument, appearing as
an amicus to argue in favor of preemption.176 The Court rejected the government’s arguments in the same way it would dismiss the unpersuasive
contentions of a litigant.177 But more recently, in Geier, the views of the
executive branch played a more prominent role in the Court’s preemption
analysis.178 In the FIFRA context, the EPA’s public stance against preemption helped drive the small groundswell of reconsideration that produced
the anti-preemption decisions in Montana and Oregon.179 The Montana
court, citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., held that it would defer to the EPA’s views on preemption.180 In Bates,
the pesticide manufacturer will undoubtedly urge the Court to defer to
EPA’s new position in favor of preemption.
But should the Court really defer to the executive branch on what is,
after all, a legal question under the Supremacy Clause? The answer is that
it depends. The purpose of preemption analysis is to determine whether and
to what extent the exercise of federal law-making authority has displaced
state authority. The Supreme Court recently explained that the deference
owed to the executive branch’s views on preemption depends on how Congress has exercised its preemptive power: either directly or by delegating
the preemption decision to the agency.181
True Chevron deference applies where the agency interprets a statutory provision that it is charged with enforcing. Such delegation of policymaking power is more common on substantive issues than on quasiprocedural issues like preemption. For example, the National Bank Act
charged the federal Comptroller of the Currency with enforcing rules governing “interest” on credit cards.182 The Supreme Court deferred to the
agency’s view that “interest” included “late fees.” Resolving this kind of
ambiguity is a policy choice, which Congress left for the agency to

176. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984).
177. See id. (stating that “exposure to punitive damages does not frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial system”).
178. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883-86.
179. The EPA’s brief was also temporarily accepted in the Ninth Circuit. In Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v.
DowElanco, 64 F.Supp. 2d 939 (C.D. Cal. 1999), the district court held that it was compelled by precedent to find preemption but urged the court of appeals to revisit the issue. The Ninth Circuit complied,
reversing the district court’s decision, 255 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2000), but then reversed itself again on
rehearing, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).
180. Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 16 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Mont. 2000) (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
181. U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
182. Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dak.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
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make.183 Under Chevron deference, the agency’s view is upheld so long as
it is reasonable.184 Delegation is less common on the preemption question,
but Sprietsma is one example, since the Federal Boat Safety Act allowed
the Secretary of Transportation to exempt state regulations from preemption.185 In most instances, however, including FIFRA, there is no delegation
of authority to the agency to make decisions about preemption.
Even outside the agency’s delegated sphere of authority, it may still be
helpful for the agency to supply a court with its views on questions of
statutory interpretation, including preemption, that affect its field of operation. In such a case, however, the agency’s views are entitled to less weight
and constitute merely “a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”186 This kind
of deference goes by the less famous moniker of “Skidmore deference,” after Skidmore v. Swift & Co.187 Under Skidmore, the agency’s argument does
not receive deference as under Chevron; instead, the agency’s argument is
accorded “respect according to its persuasiveness.”188
The difference between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference
has important implications for the government’s reversal of its position on
FIFRA preemption. Chevron deference allows the agency to make a policy
choice. Although the Court has put limits on an agency’s ability to reverse
that choice once made, the matter remains within the agency’s discretion.189
As long as the change is well-justified, it may still receive deference. With
Skidmore deference, however, the agency’s contribution is not its policy
choice but its familiarity and insight into the practical realities of implementing the statute. This institutional knowledge does not change at the
agency’s discretion, nor does the persuasiveness of an argument. When the
government reversed its position on FIFRA preemption, it was not because
it discovered an error in its previous analysis of the statute or because the
reality of implementing the statute changed. The government merely decided that it preferred a different legal analysis, one that embraced the
equivalence of tort claims and positive law, rather than one driven by the
text and history of the statute.190 The conflict between the EPA’s old brief
183. Id. at 742.
184. Id. at 744-45.
185. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 58-59 (2002).
186. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
187. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
188. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
189. See, e.g., Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742.
190. The government’s only explanation for its reversal was that it had “reexamined the position
that it urged” in prior cases, which “no longer represents the view of the United States.” Br. for the U.S.
as Amicus Curiae at 9, Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, Case No. 02-367 (U.S.).
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and the new one is not a conflict over how to exercise the agency’s discretion over policy-making but a disagreement over legal analysis. Courts do
not need agency guidance on how to perform a legal analysis of a statute,
and the arguments in both briefs, like the government’s arguments in Silkwood, should be accorded only “respect according to [their] persuasiveness.”191
When Congress regulates on matters of health and safety, its mandates
set a floor. The extent to which federal requirements are also a ceiling (and
thus additional state requirements are preempted) is a policy judgment
based on the relative value of uniformity as compared to increased safety
and the availability of compensation. Administrative agencies, however,
can reasonably be expected to have an institutional bias in favor of uniformity. Where the preemption decision has not been delegated, the
agency’s claim that tort claims would interfere with uniformity goals is a
complaint that should be directed to Congress, not the courts. The courts
should not defer to the agency’s policy judgment on this issue when Congress has not delegated the agency the authority to make that call.
CONCLUSION
As the author of the plurality opinions in Cipollone and Medtronic,
Justice Stevens has had enormous influence on the jurisprudence of FIFRA
preemption. Unfortunately, that influence has taken the form of lower
courts simplistically applying one part of Cipollone rather than imitating
the Justice’s careful analysis of the statute at issue in each case. In
Sprietsma, Justice Stevens marshaled the full Court behind an opinion correcting the lower courts’ one-sided and expansive approach to preempting
common law claims.
While the Court has previously issued and then quickly abandoned
unanimous statements regarding preemption doctrine, Sprietsma is a step
toward formulating a more coherent doctrine that will be more easily applied in the lower courts, rather than requiring the Supreme Court to address each statute one-by-one. This approach reinstates the presumption in
Silkwood that Congress would not preempt a significant number of tort
claims without giving clear indication of its intent to do so. The Court will
continue to use implied preemption analysis as a safety valve against “impossible” conflicts between state and federal law. But the Court should apply the presumption against preemption and find “obstacle” or “field” preemption only in unusual circumstances and on the basis of clear evidence
of congressional intent. Where Congress has provided an express preemp191. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
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tion clause, that clause should be taken as the full expression of the extent
to which Congress wishes to occupy the field, or the extent to which state
law would pose an obstacle to congressional policy. This more modest preemption doctrine will steer the Court away from increasing reliance on federal regulatory agencies as the sole protectors of public safety, to the exclusion of state law protections, and back toward the traditional method of
using the common law to promote safety and compensate victims of unsafe
conduct.

